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Paulo N. Figueiredo3 
Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE),  
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ABSTRACT 
Although there has been considerable research on firm-level technological capability building in 
the context of developing economies, there is a scarcity of studies which examine this issue in 
multinational enterprises’ socially motivated businesses located in less developed economies.  
This paper examines the latterissue on the basis of first-hand empirical evidence derived from an 
extensive field research on Grameen-Danone Foods Limited (GDFL) in Bangladesh. The study 
found that GDFL generated relevant spillovers to the host economy by accumulating production 
capabilities in association with innovation capabilities at intermediate levels across four 
technological functions: project management, process and production organization, product 
centred and equipment-related. Apart from revealing the types of frugal and reverse innovations 
which emanates from such a business, our study also explores – unlike existing studies which 
only focus on the financial and social benefits – the technological benefits generated froma social 
business model.Understanding the nature and dynamics of technological activities in social 
businesses of less developed economies is relevant for the achievement of enhanced local, 
autonomous and sustainable economic and social development.  
 
KEYWORDS: Technological capability building, MNE subsidiaries; social businesses, 
entrepreneurship; bottom of the pyramid; less developed countries; Bangladesh. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we are concerned with technological capability development at the level of social 
businesses located in less developed countries. Studying technological capability accumulation in 
social businesses is relevant from at least three perspectives. First, over the past several years there 
has been a profusion of studies on technological capability development in firms from developing 
and emerging economies, known as latecomers. Existing studies have contributed to our 
understanding of the paths, sequences and, to some extent, the time scales involved in the process of 
technological capability accumulation. However, most studies have focused on the conventional 
business manufacturing organizations which competes or seek to compete in global markets on the 
basis of increasingly innovative and sophisticated products, processes and production systems in fast 
growing developing and emerging economies of Latin America, Southern Africa, and South East 
Asia. Little (if anything) has been researched in terms of the process of technological capability 
building in non-firm organizations especially in the context of less developed nations. 
Understanding the process of technological capability building at the level of social business 
organizations, is important to expand our understanding of the process of economic and industrial 
development and social change, especially in the context of less developed countries.  
 
Second, most of the studies on multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) technological capabilities in 
contexts other than those of advanced economies have been in fast-growing developing and 
emerging economies where the subsidiaries are engaged in technological activities with increasing 
levels of technical sophistication and commercial aspirations towards global markets. There is 
scarce empirical evidence about the manner in which MNE subsidiaries undertake technological 
activities in social businesses, especially in the context of less developed countries. Additionally, 
most of the existing studies on MNE subsidiaries in developing countries neglect the fact that the 
subsidiaries may become sources of important spillovers to the host country (Marin and Bell, 2006).  
 
Third, over the past few years, there has been a growing attention on the emergence of social 
business models in the context of developing countries (see, for example, Yunus et al., 2010). 
However, although there has been interest in the social and financial benefits of social business 
models in less developed countries, we know little about whether  - and the extent of -  technological 
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capability accumulation at the level of social organizations in such a context and, consequently, we 
know little about their implications for local industrial development.   
 
In this paper we examine the issue of technological capability development at the level of a social 
business in the context of a less developing country. To that end, we draw on first-hand evidence 
derived from original and extensive fieldwork centred on the experience of the Grameen-Danone 
Foods Limited (GDFL) in Bangladesh. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a 
comprehensive review of the existing research on technological capabilities, thus leading to the 
research question of this paper. In Section 3 we briefly describe the empirical context where our 
study was implemented.  Section 4 contains the conceptual framework against which our empirical 
evidence will be examined. Our research methodology is presented in Section 5 followed by the 
empirical findings in Section 6. In Section 7, we outline the paper’s discussions, conclusions and 
implications.  
 
2. Literature Review  and Research Question 
In addition to the reasons outlined in the previous section, our interest in addressing the theme of 
technological capability at the level of a MNE-related social business in the context of a less 
developed country is embedded in previous research, which we review below. 
 
2.1 Nature of firm-level studies of technological capability building in developing countries  
The first refers to the nature of the evolution of the studies on technological capability building in 
the context of developing and emerging economies.  Indeed, this research field began to emerge as a 
reaction to narrow perspectives on technology in the context of developing economies that prevailed 
during the 1960s. The view that the technological role of firms and industries in developing 
countries was passive and involved the mere operation of externally supplied technologies was 
endorsed, so to speak, by the ‘dependency’ school of thought. By claiming a perpetual technological 
dependence of the peripheral developing countries on capital goods imported from ‘central’ 
economies, the representatives of this school of thought implied the absence of creative 
technological activities in firms and industries in developing countries. Given the strength and 
pervasiveness of such views in the academic and policy debates at the time, it was not surprising 
that there was little research interest in searching for, and unearthing the creative aspects 
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of,technological change in developing countries (see Lall, 1987, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1993;Bell 
and Albu, 1999; Bell 2006).  
 
This view gradually changed as a group of researchers began to develop a broader and dynamic 
view on technology in developing economies. They rejected the previous views of non-creative 
industrial technological activity in developing countries. In the early 1970s, Charles Cooper in the 
UK sought to understand how the mechanisms of international technology transfer influenced the 
long-term accumulation of change-generating capabilities in technology-importing firms and 
industries. In line with this view, Stewart and James (1982) adopted a dynamic perspective of 
technology in firms based in developing countries. However, it was a Latin American group of 
researchers, led by Jorge Katz,who initiated the first substantial and systematic research program on 
these issues in the mid-1970s. Drawing on a wealth of detailed plant-level studies, they 
demonstrated that significant innovative activities did take place in a wide range of industries. They 
also scrutinized, initially across Latin America (Katz, 1976, 1987) and Asia (Bell et al., 1982; Lall, 
1987)4, the nature and dynamics of the various learning mechanisms by which firms built up – or 
failed to build up –innovative technological capabilities over time. By doing so, they unveiled 
several aspects of technological dynamism and creativity in firms of developing economies. In 
particular, they explored the important role of learning mechanisms in influencing the manner and 
speed at which latecomer firms built up and accumulated their innovation capabilities and therefore 
determine whether they were able to catch up with global innovators. However, during the 1980s the 
issues of learning and capability building disappeared from the research agenda of latecomer firms 
and industries.  
 
During the mid-1990s a new generation of studies emerged that sought to explore the role of 
learning mechanisms in the capability accumulation of firms in emerging economies, especially in 
the fast-growing and fast-industrializing East Asian countries and later in Latin America. However, 
researchers’ interests in examining the issues of learning and capabilities in latecomer firms were 
influenced by a great emphasis and profusion of studies on learning and capabilities as sources of 
competitive advantage in the context of highly innovative firms in advanced economies. Since the 
early 2000s there has been the emergence of studies which captured innovation capabilities at the 
                                                            
4 For a review of the evolution of this research field, please see Bell (2006). 
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level of clusters and knowledge systems (Giuliani and Bell, 2005; Dantas and Bell, 2011).  
However, most of the contributions in this field havecentred on firms that target competitive markets 
on the basis of progressively advanced technologies and higher innovative products. Consequently, 
we know little about the process by which technological capabilities are accumulated in social 
business organizations.  
 
2.2 Directionality of innovation efforts towards low-income consumers and their needs 
In relation to our second source of motivation, over the past few years at least two types of 
directionality of innovative activities have been observed in latecomer firms. More specifically, 
these are: (i) the orientation of factor use and factor saving; and (ii) the orientation of innovation 
towards low-income consumers and their needs. There has been scarce research related to these 
types of innovation directions, however, we are concerned with the second type of directionality. 
Indeed, in recent years, questions about innovation and the direction of factor-use and factor-saving 
have re-emerged, with an emphasis not on capital and labour, but on energy, materials and other 
environmental/natural resources. Initially, the growing attention given to innovation and the 
environmental impact of technology focused heavily on end-of-pipe solutions, which were typically 
highly capital-intensive technologies used to reduce environmentally damaging outputs. However, 
attention shifted towards the importance of ‘win-win’ technologies – new product and process 
configurations that reduce both costs and environmental damage. Thus, progressive deepening of the 
innovation capabilities of latecomer firms may contribute to relatively ‘green’ directions of 
industrial development.  
 
In relation to the second type of innovation, the orientation to low-income consumers and its 
implications for poverty reduction – an important thread in the analysis of ‘appropriate’ directions of 
technical change in the 1970s – was concerned with the appropriateness of products, not just the 
relative capital and labour intensity of processes. It focused on the design of products and their 
consequent features and functions. The issue was seen as important for two reasons. First, product 
specifications frequently determine process specifications, thereby contributing to employment 
intensity in production. Second, the specifications of products influence their prices; and product 
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innovation can be pursued in specific directions to simplify ‘excessive’ complexity, reduce prices 
and hence raise the real income of consumers, especially low-income ones. 
 
These ideas have recently been rediscovered. In particular, Prahalad (2006) has again identified the 
‘inappropriate’ nature of product technology for consumers at the bottom of the pyramid. What is 
needed is a new direction of innovation to meet the needs of low-income consumers. Examples of 
such redirection of innovation have been identified by Zheng and Williamson (2007) in what they 
describe as the patterns of ‘cost innovation’ pursued by Chinese firms. This is similar to the ‘reverse 
innovation’ (Immelt, Govindarajan, and Trimble, 2010) and ‘frugal innovation’ (Woolridge, 
2010)approaches. These approaches have not only been about using established techniques to 
produce existing types of product at low costs based on low factor prices. It has also been about 
drawing on innovation capabilities to create unique competitive positions in low-income markets 
based on ‘new’ products that are less technologically complex than equivalent products produced by 
firms in advanced economies, such as the Nano car designed and developed by Tata. It also involves 
innovating in products and solutions, primarily in emerging markets, to serve both developing and 
advanced nations such as the electrocardiograph device for rural India and the ultrasound machine 
for rural China, which are now being sold in the USA for pioneering new applications. In this paper 
we are concerned with this second type of ‘direction’ of technological capabilities.  
 
2.3 MNE-subsidiaries themselves as generators of spillovers into their host countries  
Over the past two decades numerous studies have examined how MNE subsidiaries actively engage 
in knowledge leveraging and creation in local contexts to compete locally and/or globally (Almeida 
and Phene, 2004; Birkinshaw and Hood, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 1998). These studies have also 
shown that subsidiaries vary in the manner in which they enhance their capabilities to innovate in 
products, production processes and services in host locations. For instance, subsidiaries may engage 
in different types of innovative activities in product adaptation to local needs and in sophisticated 
high-technology projects (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005).  
 
Such activities undertaken by subsidiaries reflect the different kinds of mandates they attain over 
time. These may range, for instance, from ‘product specialists’ to ‘worldwide’ mandates 
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(Birkinshaw et al., 2000) and ‘competence-exploiting’ and ‘competence-creating’ type of mandates 
(Narula and Zanfei, 2005; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Cantwell and Kosmopoulou, 2002; 
Cantwell and Piscitello, 1999). Studies have also examined how subsidiaries engage in different 
linkages to leverage knowledge from local contexts to carry out their R&D and high-technology 
projects. However, Yamin and Otto (2004) point to the need for more empirical analyses of the 
impact of knowledge flows on subsidiaries’ innovative capabilities.  
 
From the 1990s some emerging economies in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America have become 
important sources of creative knowledge and have attracted MNE investments in sophisticated 
technological activities. But to what extent studies focusing on subsidiaries in highly industrialised 
economies are different from those in emerging and developing economies? In most studies centred 
on subsidiaries from technologically advanced locations, advanced and world leading innovative 
capabilities already exist. Researchers are concerned with how these firms exploit and augment such 
given cognitive resources in order to push the international technological frontier forward. Thus, it is 
understandable why researchers track subsidiaries’ innovative performance on the basis of cross-
sectional analyses derived from patent citations and R&D expenditures. However, in order to tackle 
the issue of innovative performance and its sources in subsidiaries operating in developing and 
emerging economies, different analytical lenses and evidence are needed. Why?   
 
As pointed out in Bell and Figueiredo (2012), MNE subsidiaries, like domestically-owned firms, 
have become embedded in, or at least have access to, increasingly pervasive international networks 
of potential sources of technology. Their competitive disadvantage lies on their initially limited 
internal capabilities for exploiting available sources of technology in order to implement innovation 
in their own production activities. Consequently, firms operating in such contexts, including 
MNEsubsidiaries, are characterised by being an ‘initially imitative’ firm, regardless of how 
dislocated they may be from markets and technology sources.  This is consistent with perspectives 
that have identified subsidiaries not simply as strategically passive components of hierarchical 
corporate structures, but as potentially active enterprises in their own right that may significantly 
shape their own paths of development at the interface between local economies and global corporate 
networks (Birkinshaw et al., 2005; Cantwell and Janne, 1999; Birkinshaw et al., 1998).  
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Like domestically-owned firms, they may move from such ‘initially imitative’ positions to others 
where they pursue significantly more innovative patterns of behaviour. There is also considerable 
heterogeneity among them in terms of the extent to which this pattern occurs (Boehe, 2007; Marin 
and Bell, 2006; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). Consequently, one of the critical tasks for 
researchers is to understand the extent to which subsidiaries move from the accumulation of 
production capabilities (or purely imitative capabilities) to the accumulation of different degrees of 
innovation capabilities in order to achieve international levels of innovative performance.  
 
Consequently, proxies like patent citations and R&D expenditures and one-point-in-time kinds of 
research designs are not helpful to tackle this issue in the context of subsidiaries operating in 
developing and emerging economies. Unlike leading subsidiaries and local firms in technologically 
advanced locations, they do not simply exploit existing knowledge to do innovation near or at the 
international technological frontier. They first need to engage in different types of knowledge-
acquisition processes to learn how to undertake production and basic levels of innovative activities 
(Kim, 1998; Bell and Pavitt, 1995).  
 
One of the expectations of MNEs operating in developing locations is that they generate spillovers 
into the host economy. There are several approaches to MNE spillovers. The prevailing approaches 
adopt a limited view on spillovers generated by subsidiaries in their host economies (see Marin and 
Bell, 2006 for a detailed critique of such approaches). With respect to this issue, we follow Marin 
and Bell (2006) and Giroud et al. (2012) by adopting a ‘bottom-up’ perspective on MNEsubsidiaries 
in terms of generation of spillovers to their host economies. On the basis of this perspective, MNE-
subsidiaries themselves are potential sources of spillovers to their host economies. Specifically, a 
large part of the technological potential for spillovers is generated within the MNE subsidiary in the 
host country on the basis of its own technological capability building process (Marin and Bell, 
2006). However, there is scant empirical evidence (if any) of this phenomenon in MNE-related 
social business models. In this paper, we seek to move further into this direction.  
 
Therefore, in light of these two motivations this paper focuses on this central question: what has 
been the nature of technological capability building in a social business organization located in a 
less developed economy? We will examine this question in the context of GDFL in Bangladesh. The 
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case study and the country offer a rich empirical context to explore this issue and to draw 
management and policy-oriented implications for development in low income locations.  
 
3. Empirical Context and Background  
Present in 52 countries through more than 180 subsidiaries, while being the world’s largest producer 
of fresh dairy products, Europe’s largest producerof medical nutrition and the world’s second largest 
producer of baby nutrition and bottled water, it is axiomatic that Danone, a large French MNE has 
world-leading innovative capabilities across diverse technological functions.  As a result, Danone 
enjoys a leading technological positionnot only in the context of advanced economies, but also 
worldwide. Even so, Danone has taken the initiative to develop a social perspective in its business 
activities by engaging in a partnership with the Grameen Group to create the GDFL. This action 
seems to reflect Danone’s concern with the implications of its business and its technological 
innovation for social development. Indeed, GDFL is unique not only to Danone but to the world. 
 
Bangladesh is a country where malnutrition is present in 30 per cent of the population. The child 
mortality rate is of 7 per cent and approximately 60 per cent of the population lives on less than 
US$2 a day. In light of this critical context, the GDFL project has the goal of enhancing nutrition 
quality of the Bangladesh’s population. GDFL was established on 16 March 2006, following the 
signing of a memorandum of understanding between Danone Group and four Grameen companies 
namely Grameen Business Promotion Services, Grameen Welfare, Grameen Energy and Grameen 
Telecom. As such, GDFL is a joint venture (JV) between Danone and its four Grameen partners.  
The social business is located in Betgari, a village on the outskirts of Bogra City in Bogra District, 
about 140 miles northwest of Dhaka.  Following its inauguration in November 2006, the plant 
started production in February 20075.  Its head office is located in Dhaka, where the Managing 
Director - Corinne Bazina - oversees the support activities such as sales, marketing, human 
resources and finance.  
 
Within the Danone Group, GDFL is managed by ‘danone.communities’, an investment fund, created 
to support businesses which aim to be sustainable whilst making social and societal goals their 
objective. GDFL’s mission is to reduce poverty by a unique proximity business model that will 
                                                            
5 For a detailed account of how the GDFL was conceptualized, please refer to Yunus (2008, 2010). 
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provide daily healthy nutrition to the poor of Bangladesh (danone.communities, 2012).  The 50-50 
social business JV covers the manufacturing, packaging, marketing, sales and distribution of fresh 
sealed yoghurt products under the Bangladeshi brand name ‘Shokti+’ (or ‘Shokti+Doi’ which 
translates into ‘Power+Yoghurt’).  The yoghurt was conceived based on the nutritional needs of 
Bangladeshi children – GDFL’s targeted consumer group – and contains Vitamin A, Zinc, Iron and 
Iodine, all of which were determined as lacking in the local population’s diet based on a study 
conducted by the non-governmental organization Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition 
(danone.communities website). The Grameen-Danone business model is represented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.The GDFLSocial Business Model 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Yunus et al. (2010) and www.grameensocialbusiness.org 
 
 
The aim of this social business, as per Professor Yunus’ seven principles of social business is to 
create a no loss, no dividend business. “Investors get back their investment amount only. No 
dividend is given beyond investment money. When investment amount is paid back, company profit 
stays with the company for expansion and improvement” (YunusCenter, 2012).  Guy Gavelle 
described by Professor Yunus (2010:56) as “Danone’s gifted engineer/designer” is the Industrial 
Director of Danone Asia Pacific operations with 40 years of industry experience.  He was called 
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upon by Professor Yunus and Franck Riboud, Danone’s CEO, to conceive the GDFL plant from 
scratch. GDFL was created to supply “3000 tons of yoghurt per year to 3 million inhabitants in 
Bogra within a radius of 30 to 50 Km. Knowing that there are 150 million people in Bangladesh, the 
plan is to eventually have 50 factories across the country each supplying within their own 30 to 50 
Km radius” (Guy Gavelle).  Thus, the profits earned by GDFL in Bogra will be used down the line 
to build the next factory and the process will continue until the other 49 factories are eventually 
built. 
 
4. Accumulation of Technological Capabilities in Latecomer Organizations 
4.1 What are technological capabilities and how to assess them? 
Firms’ capabilities include a stock of resources which permit them to undertake production and 
differing degrees of innovation activity. Such capabilities both involve the nature of ‘human capital’ 
(i.e., specialist professionals, knowledge bases and skills/talents that are formally and informally 
allocated within specific organisational units, projects and teams) and ‘organizational’ aspects (the 
firm’s internal and external organizational arrangements such as their routines and procedures, 
linkages, and managerial systems) (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Kim, 1997;Dutrénit, 2000;Teece, 2007). 
In line with previous relevant studies (Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995; Choung et al., 2006), this paper 
distinguishes between production-based and innovation capabilities and focuses on the latter. 
 
With regard to the operationalization of the capability building construct, over the past two decades, in 
the context of advanced economies the assessment of innovation capabilities has been heavily based 
on quantitative measures such as R&D intensity and expenditures and patent counts/citations 
(Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). Although it has been recognised that such measures have limitations 
as proxy indicators of innovative activity (Teece, 2007), they have been widely used in the 
innovation literature. However, such indicators reflect situations in which significantly deep levels of 
innovative capability already exist. Such measures, therefore, reveal little about the prior process of 
developing and accumulating capabilities up to the point at which they begin to generate measurable 
R&D activities or officially recorded patenting. Thus, these measures are not well suited for capturing 
data on latecomer firms on pathways of innovative capability building (see Bell, 2006;Bell and 
Pavitt, 1993; Lall, 1992). Tackling such a process is crucial for the study of innovation capability 
within latecomer firms.  
12 
 
 
 
Consequently, in this paper, we adopt an approach that has been the primary basis of research for this 
area since the earliest studies on the innovation capabilities of latecomer firms (Katz, 1987; Lall, 1987; 
Lall, 1992). This approach involves the direct acquisition of descriptive information on firms’ 
technological activities. Differences in the qualitative characteristics of these activities have been 
deemed to reflect differing categories of underlying technological capabilities. The focus on activity 
reflects a concern with process and dynamics.  
 
Specifically, this paper draws on a modified version of the typology developed in Lall (1992) and 
further refined in Bell and Pavitt (1995). The modified version of this typology identifies ‘levels’ of 
innovative capability that range from ‘basic’ to ‘world leading’ and are consistent with the 
characterisation of innovation as degrees of novelty (new to the firm, new to the economy and new 
to the world) and complexity in terms of technological activities thus consistent with the Oslo 
Manual (see OECD, 2005). Such a typology has been used extensively and successfully in studies, 
with different degrees of capability level disaggregation, which have reconstructed historical paths 
of capability accumulation over considerable time periods (Dutrénit, 2000; Figueiredo, 2002, 2010; 
Dantas and Bell, 2009).  Studies have also covered histories of capability accumulation in a much 
larger number of firms, although over shorter time periods (Hobday et al., 2004; Tsekouras, 2006; 
Iammarino et al., 2008; Ariffin and Figueiredo, 2004; Ariffin, 2010; Yoruk, 2011; Figueiredo, 2011; 
Peerally and Cantwell, 2011, 2012). Rather than identifying capabilities in terms of the specific 
resources entailed therein, these works have identified levels of innovative activity and then inferred 
the various levels of capability that underlie patterns of innovative performance. A summary of the 
typology tailored for use in this paper is provided in Table 1. The first column shows four levels of 
innovative performance that extend from ‘basic’ to ‘world leading’; the second column provides 
illustrative examples of these levels of capability.  
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Table 1:  A Framework for Assessing Technological Capabilities in a Social Business of the Dairy Industry 
Levelsof 
Technological 
Capabilities 
Project Management  Product Centered 
 
Process and Production 
Organization 
 
Equipment  
and  
Machinery 
Innovation Capabilities: Capabilities to change technologies and production system 
Level 4 
ADVANCED 
INNOVATION 
CAPABILITY 
Involves full capabilities in coordinating, supporting and 
managing the development of new production systems 
and components. Involves full capabilities in providing 
project management services, turnkey solutions and 
advanced training to subsidiaries.Basic E of individual 
facilities, expanding plant without technical assistance, 
procurement E (specifications, project analysis), plant 
commissioning, intermittent provision of technical 
assistance.  
R&D related to process and production 
organization for designing, selecting and 
upgrading yoghurt and dairy 
manufacturing/processing techniques for 
specific end uses.Develop full-scale new 
production processes and standards. 
Set up R&D centre for generating 
innovative dairy products and 
related technological skills (product 
attributes). 
Related product R&D in creating 
cost-effective and highly nutritious 
yoghurt and dairy products. 
 
Set up of R& D centre for the design 
of original equipment and 
development of new dairy 
technologies. 
Level 3 
INTERMEDIATE 
INNOVATION 
CAPABILITY 
Search, evaluation and selection of technology and raw 
material sources.  Undertaking tenders and negotiations.  
Full monitoring, control, and execution of: feasibility 
studies, search, evaluation, and selection, and funding 
activities. Own overall project outline and execution, 
providing technical assistance in expansion decisions and 
negotiations. Project management of joint venture.   
Sampling unit for creation of yoghurt 
(and/or other dairy products) and 
facilitating their production feasibility 
studies.  Reduction in defects rates. 
Reduction in waste.Continuous 
improvements in own specification 
without technical assistance, product 
development certification (e.g. HACCP) 
and involvement in world projects. 
QC Certification and Audits.   
Systematic improvements in given 
specifications, systematic ‘reverse 
engineering’, technically assisted 
design and development of 
production process and developing 
own product specifications. 
 
Original use of equipment and 
machinery. Large equipment 
revamping without technical 
assistance, detailed and basic reverse 
E, large equipment manufacturing. 
Preventive maintenance. Continuous 
basic and detailed equipment E and 
manufacturing of whole facilities 
and/or components for other 
industries, continuous technical 
assistance to other social businesses. 
Level 2: 
BASIC 
INNOVATION 
CAPABILITY 
Active monitoring and control of feasibility studies, 
technology choice, technology sourcingand project 
scheduling. Running feasibility studies before choosing 
and buying technology. Providing project management 
services to primary and support departments. Broad 
outline of project planning, technically assisted feasibility 
studies for major expansions, standard equipment 
procurement. Installations E (civil and electricity, piping, 
mechanical, metallic, refractors structures and 
architecture), technically assisted expansions, detailed E. 
Minor adaptation to local market.    
Incremental improvement in product 
quality based on informal feedback from 
clients, PC and SCs. 
In-house QC to maintain existing quality 
standards. 
Integrated automatic/semi-
automatic processes in production.  
Minor adaptation to processes and 
production.Internal defect rates 
measurement.Reduction or 
improvements of delivery times. 
Modification of equipment and 
machinery such as in-house 
adaptation to spare parts in 
production equipment.  
In-house repair and troubleshooting 
of equipment. 
Production Capabilities: Capabilities to use existing technologies and production systems
 
 
Level 1:  
OPERATION 
CAPABILITY 
Basic activities such as engaging prime contractor, 
deciding on plant location and disbursing finances from 
bank in setting up new production plant. 
Preparation of initial project outline. 
Synchronizing construction with installation works. 
Replication of product samples from PC.   
Product quality enforced QC systems 
(through PC or local regulations). 
Routine operation and testing.   
Basic maintenance of given 
facilities.  
Basic production planning and QC. 
Maintenance awareness and 
systematic preventative measures.  
Servicing of unchanging items of 
plant and machinery. 
Replication of simple equipment 
spare parts. 
Sources:  Adapted from Lall (1992), Bell and Pavitt (1995) and Figueiredo (2001) and based on authors’ own research and elaboration. 
Keys: E:  Engineering; PC: Parent Company; SC: Sister Company; QC: Quality Control.
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Although the above framework emphasises the capabilities that are internal to the firm, it also 
recognises that a substantial part of a firm’s capability to innovate is grounded in the activities of 
other organisations (e.g., consulting firms, research institutes and universities). Consequently, the 
development of innovation capability is not necessarily confined within the boundaries of a firm but 
may instead involve several interdependent actors. However, for the firm to gain access to such a 
breadth of knowledge, it must develop a substantial level of in-house expertise (Mowery, 1983) or 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), as well as a demand for local R&D outputs (Bell, 
1993). Such an approach is particularly appropriate when latecomer firms engage in the 
development of world-leading innovation capability at an early stage in their development, as 
examined herein.  
 
4.2 A social perspective on firms’ technological activities  
Over the past decades, and particularly during the past few years, there has a growing interest in the 
social impacts technological capabilities accumulated at the level of firm and industries. Initially, 
there was concern regarding the impact of technological development on the distribution of income 
and employment (Stewart, 1978; Kaplinsky, 1990). Since the early 2000s, there has been renewed 
interest in the impacts of firms’ activities, particularly their technological related activities, which 
extends beyond issues such as capital and labour to focus on energy, materials and natural resources. 
This interest has been based on a type of win-win technology that reduces both costs and 
environmental damages. A large portion of the studies addressing these issues have emphasised the 
role of incremental innovation efforts in achieving these goals. For instance, by drawing on evidence 
of energy-saving achievements in a cement plant in Thailand and waste-reducing measures in an 
electronics cluster in Malaysia, Rock and Angel (2005) and Rock et al. (2009) have stressed the 
importance of engineering-based and incremental innovation in contributing to sustainable impacts 
of technical change. In other words, it has been argued that latecomer firms’ progressive 
accumulation of innovation capabilities firms may contribute to greener industrial development 
(Bell and Figueiredo, 2012). 
 
In a similar vein, another perspective involves technology and innovation aspects but either solely in 
terms ofproduct innovation aimed at the bottom of the pyramid (Prahalad, 2006) orin terms 
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ofcorporate social responsibilityandwider welfare impacts. For instance, through their ‘blended 
value’ approach, Emerson and Twersky (1996) argue that firms can increase shareholder value by 
increasing the positive social and environmental impacts of their work while simultaneously 
addressing the concerns of wider stakeholder groups. Such an approach is consistent with the 
‘sustainable value portfolio’ perspective (Hart and Milstein, 2003), in which environmental 
sustainability and profits are viewed not as trade-offs, but rather as sustainability generating profit. 
In a similar vein, Porter and Kramer’s (2011) ‘shared value’ approach argues that firms’ 
achievement of competitive performance involves the creation of economic value in a manner which 
also creates value for society through social progress. Indeed, as argued in Porter and Kramer 
(2011), the notion of purposefully centring firms on the creation of shared value instead of profit per 
se, will drive the next wave of innovation and productivity growth in the global economy. However, 
there is a lack of empirical evidence in support for such perspectives. Indeed, there has been a 
scarcity of studies that examine the subtle relationship between technological capability building 
and social impacts, especially from the viewpoint of a social business in a developing country.  
 
By drawing on the above studies and in relation to the research question previously outlined, we argue 
that a MNE-related social business in the context of a less developed location may engage in the 
accumulation of technological capabilities for production and innovative activities thus generating 
benefits in terms of development for the host locations, and therefore creating a basis for local 
industrial and social development. This kind of relationship constitutes the conceptual framework 
underpinning this paper, as represented in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Conceptual Framework of the Study 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Figueiredo (2011); Bell and Figueiredo (2012). 
 
5. Research Methodology  
To answer our research question, the design of this study is based on an in-depth case study involving 
a social business. Such a research strategy proved appropriate for the tackling the research question 
since it facilitates understanding what lays behind a subtle and under-researched phenomenon whose 
details and nuances would not be captured by other methods, especially aggregated analysis derived 
from purely quantitative methods (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Yin, 2003). Below we 
outline the research design and methods such as empirical setting, sampling, evidence-gathering 
strategies and analysis.  
 
5.1 Case study design 
Firstly, we use an exploratory case study since our research objectives involve understanding a 
complex social situation (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2009).  Yin (2009:4) states that case studies allow for 
an understanding of complex social phenomena whereby the situational conditions are an 
important aspect of those phenomena.  Our study meets both these aforementioned conditions 
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since deploying, acquiring and creating innovative capabilities involve complex social situations 
and interactions and we seek to understand the latter within a specific situational condition 
namely a social business.  Furthermore, as there are no existing empirical works on innovative 
capabilities in social businesses, an exploratory approach is deemed most appropriate for providing 
a better understanding of the research issue at hand (Sekaran, 2003).  
 
The objective of our research is to obtain in-depth information about the “how” of innovative 
capabilities deployment, acquisition and creation in the GDFL case. According to Yin (2009:27), 
“how” questions elicit explanations which are best suited to the case study approach. Furthermore, a 
case study approach is useful in generating new knowledge in exploratory situations in which there 
are no clear and single set of outcomes (Patton and Applebaum, 2003).  Yin (2009:7) adds that 
although “what” questions are better suited to survey research methods, case study methods can 
nevertheless be applied when the “what” is exploratory in nature.  
 
5.2 Case selection 
Eisenhardt (1989), Thiétart (1999) and Evrard, Pras and Roux (2000) state that randomization is not 
a necessity in selecting cases for a study. To the contrary, cases need to be strategically selected in 
relation to the relevant theoretical background (Patton and Applebaum, 2003). Researchers must 
choose the cases with the characteristics needed for an in-depth understanding of the research 
questions. Thus, we chose a social business which uses manufacturing technology and which 
produces goods in order to adhere to our theoretical framework.   
 
5.3 Data collection and analysis 
One of the main advantages of case-based research is the opportunity to use multiple sources and 
types of evidence to achieve triangulation.In our study, the main data sources were interviews, 
published works on GDFL such as peer-reviewed articles and the books written by Muhammad 
Yunus and internal Danone documents.  Data was collected through personal, semi-structured face 
to face interviews and from non-participant observation between February and March 2012, at the 
GDFL factory in Bogra. The face-to-face interviews were tape-recorded with the consent of the 
interviewees and transcribed for analysis.  Follow-up interviews were also conducted in Paris during 
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May 2012.  All key management, quality control and production related employees at GDFL were 
interviewed and as such a comprehensive view innovative capability was obtained. Data analysis 
was conducted by examining, categorizing, tabulating and recombining (as per Yin, 2009) the data 
on innovative capability deployment and creation from the time GDFL was created in 2006 to 2012.  
The goal of our analytic strategy is “to treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling analytic 
conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations” (Yin, 2009:111). The result of this analysis 
takes the form of a case study which is presented in the following section.  
 
6. Empirical Findings  
In light of the framework in Section 4, this section presents the main empirical findings of our study. 
We begin by presenting an overview of the findings in Section 6.1 followed by the detailed findings 
of our case studyrelated to the accumulation of capabilities in Section 6.2.  
 
6.1 Overview of findings  
Firstly, our study assesses the innovative capabilities which were accumulated in GDFL from 2006 
to 2012.  Our findings reveal that GDFL has upgraded to the intermediate innovative capability level 
across all functions.  Such upgrade especially in terms the Production and Equipment Related 
Functions were primarily due to the social business’ efforts since 2010 to create and launch a new-
to-the-world diary product, namely a dairy pouch product.  Such upgrade is in line with the existing 
empirical evidence that innovative capability accumulation entails the intensity, persistence and 
effectiveness with which firms manage and invest in the process of acquiring and creating 
knowledge bases that they need to conceive and implement the necessary innovative strategies.  
Furthermore, it highlights the fact that the GDFL subsidiary is not a strategically passive component 
of Danone’s hierarchical corporate structure, but instead is a potentially active enterprise in its own 
right engaged in significantly shaping its own path of development. 
 
Secondly, in order to analyze the accumulation of capabilities in the GDFL case, it was necessary to 
present the backdrop against which the social business was created and hence Danone’s activities 
related to the Project Management Functions.  From the emerging literature on the role of frugal 
innovations (for e.g. Immelt, Govindarajan, and Trimble, 2010; Woolridge, 2010 and Tiwari and 
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Herstatt, 2012),  Tiwari and Herstatt (2012:4) for example, define frugal innovations as new or 
significantly improved products, processes or marketing and organizational methods that seek to 
minimise the use material and financial resources in the complete value chain with the objective of 
reducing the cost of ownership while fulfilling or even exceeding certain pre-defined criteria of 
acceptable quality standards.  While there has been significant research on frugal products such as 
those developed by General Electric, Tata Motors and Siemens not much has been explored with 
regards to frugal innovations in the processes of latecomer firms.  In the case of GDFL, the path for 
capability accumulation has been determined in large part by Danone’s need to follow frugal 
investments and innovations in its processes primarily.  The need to adhere to this premise has in 
turn led to various mechanisms for frugally dictated innovative capability accumulation both for the 
parent company – Danone - as well as for the social business subsidiary. 
 
6.2 Accumulation of technological capabilities for specific functions 
6.2.1 Capability accumulation for project management activities  
Since this was Danone’sfirst venture in creating of a social business, the MNE had only a vague 
grasp as to the level of investment the project would entail.   For premium yoghurt factories, which 
produce about 50,000 tons per year, with an average cost of €750 per ton, Danone invests about 
€37,500,000 per factory.  Thus, in November 2005 the initial cost for the project was estimated by 
Guy Gavelle at €1.2 million which seemed low and feasible when compared to premium yoghurt 
factories. “At the beginning, we didn’t know exactly how much it would cost… We didn’t really have 
an idea of volume since we were treading on virgin territory where we didn’t know what we will 
produce – water, biscuits or yoghurt - and how much… Afterwards, we agreed on yoghurt since this 
is what Professor Yunus wanted.  He really wanted a value-added product in terms of nutrition” 
(Guy Gavelle).   Thus, despite the MNE’s advanced capabilities in the Project Management 
Functions, it did not have the capabilities necessary for ascertaining the cost of such a venture.   
 
Following initial negotiations and discussions with Professor Yunus and theGrameen JV partners, 
Danone’s Singapore subsidiary conducted the feasibility studies for the GDFL project. The 
Singapore team revealed that an investment of €1.2 million would imply that GDFL would not 
amortize or that the yoghurt would have to be sold at premium prices which in turn would defeat the 
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purpose of creating a social business which sells affordable yoghurt. There were other factors to 
consider as Guy Gavelle explained. “Despite the fact GDFL would be our entry ticket into 
Bangladesh, we could not over-commit financially, in case we could not reimburse our loans for 
building and equipping the factory.  And since our sealed yoghurt product, unlike the local 
MishtiDoi, was a first time product in a country where there is no existing cold chains for dairy 
products, we could not put down too much money.  There were too many risks.”  Danone Singapore 
concluded that an investment of BDT 58 million (€600,000) can be feasibly committed to the 
project.  Hence, between the initial estimate of €1.2 million and a premium factory which would 
have entailed an approximate investment of €2.25 million for 3000 tons of premium yoghurt per 
year, the investment was reduced by 50 to 73 percentfor the whole GDFL project including land, 
building and equipments.  Such frugal investment dictated the course of innovative capability 
development in Danone and GDFL. 
 
Despite having advanced innovation capabilities in project management, Danone relied on its 
Grameen JV partners to find a suitable site and contractors for the plant.  The specifications for the 
site provided by Danone included surface area, non-floodable, accessible by road, a river close by 
for the purification station, access to non-contaminated water and gas and electricity mains. 
However, Imamus Sultan (Representative of the Grameen JV partners) was called upon to help 
Danone overcome issues related to liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995).  As explained by Guy 
Gavelle, “It took us quite a while to find a site since once you carry the name Grameen-Danone, 
well Grameen first, it’s a bank, it’s perceived as having money - the prices rise.  And when you find 
the land, you are told by the sellers that there are no problems to sell, but in the end you find out 
that the land is owned by 20 people, there are no deeds and there is always one seller who is not 
willing to sell.  So Grameen managed the problems related to the land purchase”.  This 
demonstrates that a socially motivated initiative by a large multinational enterprise is just as 
susceptible to liability of foreignness.  In 2006, the site was selected and construction began in July 
2006 and completed four months later.   
 
In parallel, Danone worked on the project management aspect of GDFL in terms process and 
production technologies.  With regards to the process design and the purchase of process 
equipments, Guy Gavelle ventured outside the usual external network used by Danone.  He 
explained that for premium factories at around €20,000,000 to €37,500,000, Danone uses large 
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MNEs from England, France and Germany as integrators and suppliers.  He also conceded that, 
“Even if these European integrators and suppliers have subsidiaries in China, they are expensive 
since they are managed by foreigners.  The price you will pay just in terms of project management 
and process design with these large multinationals will be the same as the price of the Bogra 
factory!” Consequently, an independent domestic integrator from Nanjing (China) was enlisted to 
draw up the process for GDFL.  Although the company was aMNE, it was deemed appropriate since 
the owner and integrator had worked in Germany for several years and had excellent expertise in 
process design.  The design process for GDFL was drawn up in collaboration with Danone so that it 
would be as simple as possible. 
 
Danone also focused on additional cost-cutting measures for the social business such as reducing 
energy consumption. The standard industry yoghurt making process requires a substantial amount of 
energy especially with the heating and cooling involved in steps 2, 5 and 7 of the process. After 
fermentation, cooling the yoghurt down to 20oC is vital in order to maintain its pH at 4.5 and 
prevent the product from over-fermenting.  Danone’s Paris R&D department was requested to create 
a culture which will be used at step 6 of the process and which will automatically stop fermenting 
when it reaches a 4.5pH.  In pursuing this effort the R&D department generated a key innovation 
which has consequently and invariably changed the existing industry-wide standard yoghurt making 
process. “It’s an intelligent culture!  It’s called the ‘Dream Culture’ and Danone had it patented 
like all its other cultures.  Now we use it in our India subsidiary and saving on energy costs there as 
well” (Guy Gavelle).  The Dream Culture will have significant energy-related cost reduction 
impacts on all of Danone’s future investments in new factories.  Furthermore, there is a process of 
reverse innovation (as per Immelt, Govindarajan and Trimble, 2009; Govindarajan and Ramamurti, 
2011) whereby the culture is being used in Danone’s Indian subsidiary.  Thus, apart from fulfilling a 
social need, Danone’s internal network also benefitted from its need to pursue frugal investments in 
the creation of GDFL. 
 
 
The suppliers of process equipments (such as coolers, flow meter, pipes) and packaging equipments 
were all independent Chinese suppliers outside Danone’s regular supplier network.  After the 
process was designed, it was tested at the integrator’s facility in Nanjing and shipped to Bogra.  
Once assembled in Bogra, the process was deemed still too complex for GDFL’s purpose and was 
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further simplified through the joint efforts of the GDFL team lead by Guy Gavelle and the 
integrator’s team. 
 
Adhering to the premise of frugal innovations also led to increased embeddedness with the local and 
regional businesses.  “I looked for utilities which were from India, Bangladesh and China and which 
were not expensive.  And they must be adapted to the country:  that is easy to repair.  If possible, the 
suppliers had to have a representative in Bangladesh because it is always difficult when you have 
problems and there are no local representatives” (Guy Gavelle). The three systems - process, 
utilities and packaging machine – for example were connected by hiring a local Bangladeshi 
engineer who owns a welding company.   
 
Frugal investments also implied that Danone had to rely on donations or find creative ways to outfit 
GDFL.  The electrical system was donated by French MNE Schneider, through its Bangladeshi 
subsidiary.  France’s Definox and PCM donated the valves and pumps respectively.  Danone’s 
several subsidiaries donated laboratory equipments, vats and even plastic crates. Creative initiatives 
included hiring a local from Bogra to make inox cable trays which carry electrical wires throughout 
the factory and cost BDT 5 (about €0.05) per meter while in Danone’s home country at the time the 
cost was €20 to €30 per meter.  Another challenge as Guy Gavelle recounts was buying the 
ammonia compressor to aliment the cold room.  “Finding a supplier here was not easy and it would 
have been expensive.  Or we would have had to import one, again expensive.  So I sent the guys to 
the boat cemetery in Chittagong and asked them to disassemble a compressor from an old boat and 
bring it here.  We still use it to this day to aliment our cold room” (Guy Gavelle).  Hence, the need 
to be frugal led Danone to tap into a base of social capital and creativity which had remained up to 
that point untapped and which contributed to its existing base of innovative capabilities. 
 
In February 2007, the GDFL plant began production with a total of 30 employees.  From these, half 
were engaged in process and production activities.  In order to launch the social business, Danone 
brought a team from its Indonesian subsidiary to train the local Bogra employees over a period of 15 
days.  The team included the Indonesian subsidiary’s director and quality control, maintenance and 
production personnel. The Indonesian team was selected for this task by Danone since their 
subsidiary, which opened in 2004; resembled GDFL’s technological level the most.  Guy 
Gavelleexplained that Danone’s more technologically advanced subsidiaries would not have been 
23 
 
 
 
appropriate, since these were all highly automated.He added, “This training highly motivated the 
locals and at the same time, it helped us achieve what we came here to do.  Plus they are all 
Muslims, they were very happy.  They didn’t drink alcohol, they went to the mosque together.  So 
there was a formidable relationship between the Indonesian team and the new Bogra team”.  Thus, 
this internal knowledge socialisation process of sharing production capabilities did not only involve 
a similar level of technology but also a shared culture.   
 
At the GDFL head office in Dhaka, project management capabilities were being accumulated 
through a combination of external knowledge acquisition and internal knowledge socialisation 
process.  Danone was adamant that all project management activities for the future construction of 
GDFL factories, barring the current one, would be handled by the Bangladesh team.  The current 
management committee in Dhaka is composed of the Managing Director, Finance Manager, Supply 
Chain, Sourcing and Supplier Development (SSD) Manager, Marketing Manager, Human Resources 
Manager and Retail Manager. All the recruited managers are university graduates and Bangladeshis, 
for the exception of the Marketing Manager.  The internal knowledge socialisation process involved 
continued interactions with the parent and sister companies.  The Finance Manager visited Danone 
India on several occasions to participate in Danone’s collective training program.  He has also been 
trained for 10 days by the Financial Director of the Greece Danone subsidiary.  The SSD manager 
also spent 10 days in Greece and he was additionally trained by Danone Paris’ SSD Manager during 
the former’s two 15-day visits to Bangladesh.  A member of the local SSD manager’s team was sent 
to Danone Saudi Arabia’s SSD department. The R&D and Quality manager spent 15 days at Danone 
France and Spain and visited a factory and the Danone Dairy R&D centre in Paris.  The Human 
Resources Manager completed a one and a half year training program for the whole Asia zone 
which is an internal Danone training program for the group’s management 
committee.CorinneBazina, GDFL’s Managing Director, explained the importance of such 
knowledge socialization process, “These training opportunities allow the GDFL managers to 
connect with the Danone network and develop key competencies.”Interviews with Guy Gavelle and 
Corinne Bazina revealed that the GDFL teams in Bogra and Dhaka have built the project 
management capabilities necessary for independently implementing the projected building (in 2013) 
and start-up of the second GDFL factory located near Dhaka, as well with the continued growth of 
the Bogra plant.  They both listed several accumulated intermediate innovative capabilities such as 
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undertaking tenders and negotiations; conducting feasibility studies; searching, evaluating and 
selecting technology and raw material sources; new plant start-up. 
 
6.2.2 Capability accumulation for process and production organization activities  
When the plant was first built, the requirement for the packaging automated system (a PLC, 
programmable logic controller) for the yogurt product was that it had to be purchased from an 
existing Danone supplier, a well-known German MNE.  This enterprise has a subsidiary in India and 
Guy Gavelle recounts the following anecdote. “I went to see them at their Indian subsidiary and I 
said: ‘I need a PLC for Bangladesh.  How much will it cost?’He (representative at Indian 
subsidiary) said: ‘It depends on who is ordering.’  I said: ‘Well listen, it’s Bangladesh, why this 
question?’ He said: ‘If it is Bangladesh, you will get a Bangladeshi price and if it is France a 
French price.’I said: ‘But wait, it’s made in India, why are you giving me a French price?’  He 
said: ‘Well yes, if it is ordered by France, then it’s a French price’ (Guy Gavelle). This point 
reinforces the fact that frugal innovations requires breaking down barriers, having recourse to  
suppliers which were outside Danone’s existing network, which in turn adds to the existing 
innovative capabilities of the parent company and GDFL.Furthermore, despite having received 
equipment donations from other MNEs, such breaking down of corporate barriers is deemed 
necessary until large MNE suppliers and integrators are willing to adjust their prices such social 
motivated initiatives. 
 
The packaging equipment – the Zhongya – was ordered from an independent Chinese supplier.  
Once on-site, the Zhongya’s supplier installed the equipment and helped run the first trials. 
Furthermore, Danone aimed at using biodegradable yoghurt pots in Bangladesh. “There are two 
suppliers in the world - Cargill in the US and a Chinese one.  I opted for the Chinese one, a huge 
pharmaceutical company which makes biodegradable plastic spoons and forks used in airplanes.  
They never made yoghurt pots before.  I also discussed with the Zhongya supplier and they agreed 
to adapt their machine for this plastic.  We tried it on the Zhongya and it worked really well” (Guy 
Gavelle).  In this case, both the biodegradable plastic supplier and the Zhongya supplier benefited 
from reverse learning.  This illustrates that frugal investment in a manufacturing-based social 
businesscan be conducive to inter-industry reverse technological learning linkages which are centred 
on learning to innovate or interacting for creating innovations. 
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Accumulation of innovative capabilities in process and production is an on-going aspect at GDFL, 
which is based mainly on an internal knowledge socialisation process.  Maniruzzaman Mohsin, 
GDFL Quality Control Executive since 2009, recounts that in 2011 they encountered a yoghurt 
viscosity problem.  For a product to be released on the market its texture should be of a certain 
thickness. The Quality Control team were faced with yoghurt batches which were liquid and which 
implied a high reject rate.  Through interactions with Guy Gavelle, the Bogra Quality Control team 
learnt how to standardize milk before starting the process in order to overcome such viscosity 
problems. Thereafter, the team faced a finished yoghurt foaming problem, whereby 2500 litres of 
product would foam while in the fermentation tank, leading once again to a high reject rate.  “We 
had to destroy several batches.  What we did is we tried to define the sources of the problem.  We 
found out the problem came from the one of our two chilling centres where the milk is stored before 
it arrives to our factory.  We took all the milk to our lab and tested it.  We were able to pinpoint 
which supplier was giving us bitter and adulterated milk which led to the foaming issue.”  This 
highlights the fact that the quality controllers are capable of adopting an independent problem 
solving and searching through experimentation approach. Aside from those two isolated incidents, 
Maniruzzaman Mohsin states that GDFL’s reject rate for finished yoghurt product is on average less 
than 1 percent. 
 
The Quality Control team at GDFL consists of a Quality Control and R&D Manager recruited in 
October 2011, two Quality Control Executives – one of which is also a new recruit - and seven 
laboratory technicians.  Prior to the R&D manager being recruited, R&D was being overseen by 
Danone Germany.  Maniruzzaman Mohsin explained, “With the new pilot pouch project6, Germany 
sent the parameters and specifications for process and production.  We did a lot of trials.  
Sometimes the Germany team came here and I learnt from them and I replicated.  Sometimes, I 
would have to modify the specifications myself.  For implementing product modifications, we are 
quite autonomous, but before implementing process modifications generated here at GDFL, we 
would have to receive approval from Germany’s R&D team first.” The pilot project therefore 
exemplifies technically assisted design and development of production process through an internal 
knowledge socialisation process between GDFL and its Germany-based sister company.   Moreover, 
the pilot pouch project demonstrates that GDFL is capable of developing its own product 
                                                            
6A full description of the pilot pouch product for the creation of a new to the world dairy product is provided in the 
following Subsection 6.2.3. 
26 
 
 
 
specifications albeit under the approval of Danone Germany.  Interviews revealed that such approval 
processes – mostly with the aim of upholding Danone’s food and safety standards - impeded to a 
large extent GDFL’s ability to independently upgrade its innovative capabilities.  
 
In terms of waste management, liquid industrial waste runs to an effluent treatment plant while the 
solid wastes (mainly plastic) are stored in special dustbins where local vendors can purchase them 
by the kilo for resale to recycling companies.  With regards to market wastage such as market 
returns of yoghurt, the cups are crushed and the yoghurt is redirected to a biogas chamber which was 
constructed at the same time as the GDFL.  As for the crushed cups and other plastic waste, they are 
also sold to local vendors for recycling purposes. 
 
6.2.3 Capability accumulation for product-centred activities  
When GDFL first started operations, the aim was not to produce premium products like those sold in 
Danone’s other subsidiaries across the globe.  The Shokti+ was initially conceived as an affordable 
plain yoghurt at BDT 5 (€0.05) for an 80 grams pot, reinforced with nutrients for the local children 
and only a 4-day shelf life due to the lack of an appropriate cold chain to preserve the product once 
it leaves the factory.  Danone’s premium products in other countries have shelf lives ranging from 
25 to 50 days and cost over 10 times more.  Originally, the product was meant to be sold only in 
Bogra through small shops and by Grameen-Danone ladies (on foot, door-to-door sales ladies).  
Once the yoghurt would reach the shops and the Grameen-Danone ladies, through simple yet fast 
transportation channels composed of rickshaws, bicycles and CNGs (gas operated auto-rickshaws), 
the objective was that the yoghurt would be bought and consumed within the same day.  
 
Before the plant began production operations, the formulation of the product was made in the local 
GDFL laboratory and sent to Danone’s Spain subsidiary where the first product sample was 
conceived and shipped back to GDFL.  Once the factory was operational, trials were run in Bogra 
with the local milk and the yoghurt was adapted to the local milk’s quality.  The local milk is low in 
protein content so the Bogra team incorporated extra protein in the product formulation and market 
tests were run.  The market revealed that the yoghurt did not adhere to the local taste.  “In the 
beginning the Shokti+ contained 10% sugar and we realized that the locals didn’t like the taste of 
the 10%.  It wasn’t sweet enough” (Guy Gavelle).    Through a local and internal knowledge 
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acquisition process, based on searching, the GDFL team came across date molasses which is a local 
natural sweetener.   “Using the date molasses, we increased the sugar content to 13% and this 
increase is something which could only have been realized locally in our lab, it would have never 
occurred in another subsidiary as 13% sugar in yoghurt is usually considered too high” (Guy 
Gavelle).  Furthermore, since date molasses have never been used by Danone before, it had to be 
tested in Danone Spain in order to be approved as a sweetener by the Group. However, this new 
yoghurt formulation also underwent further trials at the GDFL.  This shows GDFL’s capabilities for 
incremental improvement in product quality and minor product adaptation to the Bangladesh’s 
market. Nevertheless, some reliance on Danone’s internal network is required for the purpose of 
respecting the MNE’s food and safety standards. 
 
In terms of quality standards, GDFL applied Danone’s specifications since it began operations.  The 
local quality team was trained by Danone to implement these specifications.  Furthermore, since 
GDFL is the first business to sell sealed yoghurt pots on the Bangladeshi market, there were no 
formalized specifications at the local government’s Bangladesh Standard Testing Institute (BSTI).  
Maniruzzaman Mohsin explained that, “The BSTI had standards for other dairy products such as 
pasteurized milk, butter and ghee7.  So based on Guy’s (Gavelle) specifications, GDFL went to the 
BSTI and gave them the standards.  People will not buy our yoghurt without the BSTI logo because 
it is a trusted regulation.  However, BSTI got the standards from Danone… We are certified with 
them so we are in compliance with the Bangladesh standards.” Thus, GDFL’s capabilities in terms 
of quality control standards relied on an internal knowledge socialisation process.  Additionally, the 
local team engaged in a process of knowledge codification which the BSTI benefited from.   
Following a 100 percent increase in milk price in April 2008 coupled with the fact that the GDFL 
was not yet self-sustainable the Grameen JV partners, in consultation with Professor Yunus, decided 
that the business should expand its customer base to include those with a higher purchasing power.  
The GDFL would therefore also produce and sell premium yoghurt at a premium price in large cities 
such as Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet through modern trade shops (large supermarkets).  This 
strategic decision had important implications for GDFL’s innovative capabilities in terms of product 
adaptation, cold chain management and quality certification among others. By March 2009, the 
product range was increased to include valorised mango and strawberry flavoured yoghurts in 60 
                                                            
7 Ghee is a clarified butter which originates from South Asia and commonly used for cooking.  
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and 80 grams pot.  Since minor product adaption capabilities had already been acquired at this stage 
by GDFL, the trials and testing for the 2 new flavours were done in-house, as was the case with the 
recently created 60 grams pot of extra protein plain yoghurt.   
 
With regards to cold chain creation and management, recall that the original Shokti+ was for a 4-day 
shelf life. With the added sales through modern trade shops and large cities located far from Bogra, 
the 60 grams pots’ shelf-life was extended to 10 days and the 80 grams pots to 20 days.  
Maniruzzaman Mohsin details how the creation of a cold chain was independently managed by the 
local Bogra team.  Over a period of a few months, the products, after being packaged, were kept in 
refrigerators and tested.  The GDFL Quality Control team found that if they maintained the cold 
chain, the products’ shelf life could be extended to 30 days.  So today, after packaging, the products 
are kept in the cold room for 24 hours.  Thereafter, the products are released from Quality Control 
and sent to the supply chain.  The supply chain delivers the products through refrigerated vans and 
to the various GDFL owned cold rooms in all main markets.  From these cold rooms, other 
refrigerated vans deliver the yoghurt to the modern trade shops where the products are kept in 
fridges. “So we are sure that the cold chain is maintained and we have a product shelf life of 20 
days.  It was very challenging for us to have a cold chain for all our main markets… I had visited a 
lot for all the distribution areas to ensure that the cold chain was maintained and learnt a lot from 
this experience” (Maniruzzaman Mohsin).The accumulation of capabilities related to the cold chain 
creation and managementwas therefore independently implemented and managed at the level of 
subsidiary. 
 
Since, GDFL now reaches more consumers, steps are being taken to become HACCP (Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Points) certified, a process managed by the local GDFL quality control 
team.  With a view to increase sales and profits, a new to the world dairy pouch product is currently 
being tested for launch.  It is crucial to present this pilot project due to the fact that it highlights the 
accumulation of innovative capabilities at the level of GDFL.  With the rising price of milk, the 
pouch – a drinkable fermented dairy product – made with local cereals and unlike yoghurt which 
uses 80 percent milk, entails 50 percent or less milk.  Furthermore, this product if launched on the 
market will be stored, distributed and sold at ambient temperature with a 20-day shelf life thereby 
not adding to the existing cold chain capacity.  The local raw materials including the cereals for this 
pilot project were sent to Danone’s Germany subsidiary where the first product formulation was 
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made.  “The protocols and formulation were then sent here to GDFL and we implemented it. 
However, we did further adaptation in terms of process and flavours.  The original formulation was 
for a milky flavour.  Then here we did the trials and tests for 25 flavours and settled on 4.  
Afterwards, GDFL’s marketing team did the consumer tests for these 4 flavours.  This product is 
important for our social business because it allows us to reach deep rural areas where people living 
in poverty don’t have refrigerators” (Maniruzzaman Mohsin).  These process and product 
adaptations and trials in the creation of this new to the world product and the local team’s 
participation in the production feasibility studies demonstrates that intermediate innovative 
capabilities have been attained under this function.   
 
6.2.4 Capability accumulation for equipment-related activities  
In terms of day-to-day operations, GDFL has the capabilities to troubleshoot problems such as those 
related to the boiler or air compressor.  Like Maniruzzaman Mohsin, SadiqHasan, Maintenance-in-
Charge since 2006 had previously worked at Bangladesh’s BRAC Dairy.  He states, “Big 
automation problems I cannot fix.  When there was a problem with the output card of the server 
motor on the Zhongya, I needed help because this is an automation problem. But electrical and 
mechanical side I can manage. When we first started at the GDFL, I set up the ammonia compressor 
for the cold room. Or when we had a problem with the static frequency convertor – the VLT 
convertor an electrical component – I called the Fuji distributor in Bangladesh and I fixed the 
problem” (SadiqHasan).  Nevertheless, GDFL has the capability to maintain the automated 
Zhongya, however in terms of adaptation and servicing, it relies on the supplier. The accumulation 
of capabilities in terms of troubleshooting and maintenance of utilities and equipments was 
primarily through hiring an employee who had a university education and previous work experience 
in the industry.  The latter also implied that Sadiq Hassan has a significant access to local sources of 
knowledge as illustrated with the Fuji example. 
 
Most of the innovative capability development opportunities came with the pilot pouch project.  
When GDFL implemented the pilot pouch project, due to its higher viscosity when compared to 
yoghurt, a new pump, sterilizer and packaging machine had to be installed as part of the process and 
production organization.  To run the pilot project, a temporary packaging equipment - the U-Flex - 
was ordered from India and delivered in June 2010.  The U-Flex is a standard equipment used for 
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dry powdered products such as detergents which are packaged at room temperature.  The pouch 
product is liquid and it has to be packed at 75oC to prevent the cultures from further developing or 
avoid problems related to bacteria and mould.  Since, there are no existing equipments on the global 
market for packaging a hot liquid product, the U-Flex hadto be modified at GDFL by Guy Gavelle 
and SadiqHasan forthe purpose at hand. Several of the spare parts in this modification process were 
made in Bangladesh based on the specifications provided by GDFL.  Guy Gavelle explained, 
“Since, GDFL is the first place where the pouch product was being tested in the Danone Group, I 
chose the U-Flex machine to run the pilot project, which costs around €6000.  To adapt an existing 
machine which doses and packages cold powdered products to this end, from a European supplier, 
can cost up to €400,000.  I want to spend a maximum of €30,000 on the final equipment which we 
will eventually implement.”The original use of U-Flex equipment demonstrates the upgrade of 
innovative capabilities to the intermediate level, while the development of local spare parts in this 
process is equally important in terms of local capability spillover effects, both of which were 
motivated by frugal needs.   
 
As mentioned earlier and based on our interviews, there is no existing equipment which doses hot 
liquid dairy products.  In parallel to undertaking the pilot project, GDFL worked with an Indian 
subsidiary of a German MNE to develop an equipment which will be implemented and replace the 
U-Flex once the pilot is completed.  The equipment - the Hassia – was modified and created within a 
year, based on GDFL’s specifications.  This illustrates that frugal investment in a social business is 
conducive to inter-industry reverse technological learning linkage centred on collaboration for 
technology development. While the pilot pouch project was ongoing at GDFL, Danone’s Algerian 
and Indian subsidiaries decided to create a pouch product as well.  The first Hassia was implemented 
in Danone Algeria and the second in Danone India.GuyGavelle stated, “If the pilot pouch project is 
successful in Bangladesh, we will purchase the Hassia for GDFL as well.  However, at the end of 
the day, it is through Bogra’s pilot project that such technology transfer occurred in the adaption 
and creation of the Hassia equipment for hot liquid dairy products”.  Thus, there is a synergy in the 
GDFL case between collaborating with external sources of knowledge for technology development 
which trickles back to the Danone internal network akin to a reverse innovation process.  
Furthermore, the global yoghurt industry stands to also benefit from this innovation, as Danone only 
requires suppliers keep exclusivity over an innovation for a maximum period of one year. 
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The tubular sterilizer for the pouch product was supplied by Danone’s Germany subsidiary and its 
related spare parts for adaptation to GDFL’s process were purchased in Bangladesh.  Due to lack of 
space inside the existing plant, it was installed on GDFL’s roof above the process facility.  “I did the 
whole electrical and mechanical design for the pipelines of the tubular sterilizer; even the plant 
manager couldn’t help me in this process.  This is my biggest achievement in the company.  In 
March 2012, the PCM pump was delivered from China.  No-one from the supplier came here and I 
didn’t have time to go to their company.  So I took it apart and put it back together and that’s how I 
learnt how to design and install it” (SadiqHasan). Such efforts towards revamping a large 
equipment without technical assistance, for example, illustrates that the GDFL has attained 
intermediate innovative capabilities in terms of the equipment-related function. 
 
7. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
In this study we sought to explore the process of technological capability building at the level of a 
MNE-related social business in the context of a less developed country. We examined this topic on 
the basis of first-hand empirical evidence gathered through an extensive fieldwork. We have 
adopted a novel approach for assessing technological capabilities, which is based on a typology that 
identifies levels of progressively higher levels of complexity and innovativeness of activities related 
to project management, process and production organization, product-centred and equipment-
related. This typology has been tailored to examine technological capability in this particular type of 
social business model. By doing so, this study unveiled evidence of production-based technological 
activities as well as the development of innovative capabilities to the intermediate level for diverse 
activities (Table 2). Therefore, this study sheds new empirical light on our understanding of 
technological development in the context of MNE subsidiary in a less developing country. More 
specifically, this paper generates the following contributions to the field of technological capability 
building in the context of developing locations, as well as some management and further research 
implications. 
 
First, by moving beyond most of the existing studies in this field, our study has examined the issue 
of technological capability development in the context of a social business model. The study has 
shown that, it is possible to accumulate production-based capabilities and also to move up into the 
accumulation of progressive higher levels of innovation capabilities across a number of 
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technological functions. The evidence suggests that the manner in which this process of 
technological capability development proceeds does not differ substantially from the type of 
technological capability building process proceeds in conventional business firms.  
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Table 2.Types and Levels of Technological Capabilities Accumulated at GDFL 
 
Levels of technological 
capabilities 
Technological functions 
Project 
management 
Processes and 
production 
organization 
 
Product-
centred 
Equipment-
related 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation 
capabilities 
 
Advanced 
(Level 4) 
 
 
Not attained 
 
Not attained  Not attained Not attained 
 
Intermediate 
(Level 3) 
 
Fully attained Fully attained Fully attained Fully attained 
 
Basic 
(Level 2) 
 
Fully attained Fully attained Fully attained Fully attained 
 
Production 
Capabilities 
 
Basic 
(Level 1) Fully attained Fully attained 
 
Fully attained 
 
Fully attained 
Source: Derived from triangulation of data from the empirical study. 
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Therefore, such a process of technological development can be stimulated in different types of 
organizations beyond the typical firm as an added engine for aiding local industrial development. 
Through our interviews, it was revealed that the GDFL’s previous plant manager, Probir Kumar 
Sarker, now Chief Engineer at the Dhaka Ice Cream Industries Limited, built and adapted a mini-
replica of GDFL’s process to ice cream production as part of a pilot project.   This shows that 
spillovers for intersectoral industrial development between a MNE’s social business– GDFL - and a 
domestic firm has already occurred and are therefore potentially possible through manufacturing-
based social businesses.   
 
Second, unlike the existing literature which focus primarily the creation of ‘new products’ that are 
less technologically complex than equivalent products produced by firms in advanced 
economies,our study provides evidence for frugal and reverse innovations, in ‘new process’ 
relatedandtechnologically complex - or R&D intensive - inputs (the Dream Culture) and equipment 
(the Hassia). These frugally dictated innovations were created for a less developed country context 
and later adopted in more advanced subsidiaries within Danone’s network. 
 
Third, by identifying the accumulation of those types and levels of technological capabilities at the 
level of this MNE-related social business, this study has argued that the technological capabilities 
developed at the level of this social business are indeed a locally-driven source of spillover into the 
host context. In other words, instead of passively receiving directives from its parent company, the 
local subsidiary, even in the context of a social business model, may independently engage in 
technological capability development, thus creating a potential source for spillover to its host 
economy. Therefore, this study throws new empirical light on the debate relative to the role of 
MNEs in less developed and developing locations. Understanding their processes for technological 
capability development can help local policy makers in taking added comprehensive measures to 
involve MNEs as a key component of local policies to achieve development and social changes.  
 
Fourth, by exploring the process of technological capability development at the level of GDFL in 
Bangladesh our study has contributed to further our understanding of the nature and dynamics of the 
social business model as a source of local development and social change. So far, relevant existing 
studies (e.g., Yunus et al., 2010) have focused on financial and social benefits, but not technological 
benefits generated within these business models. Understanding the nature and dynamics of 
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technological activities in social business models in developing and less developed locations is 
relevant for the achievement of enhanced local, autonomous and sustainable economic and social 
development. Such type of evidence is also important to widen our perspective and to stimulate 
further studies on the potential for more socially concerned types of capitalism.  
 
Fifth, our study carries some managerial implications in terms of highlighting the creative ways in 
which a MNE can minimize investments (and overall costs) in the setting up of a social business by 
(i) enlisting a trustworthy local JV partner who can help overcome the local challenges of 
obstructive bureaucracy; (ii) relying on donations for equipment from sister subsidiaries and other 
MNEs which are in the investing MNE’s existing network; (iii) using local businesses to 
manufacture utilities or connect different parts of the plant’s process; (iv) recycling equipment (e.g., 
the case of GDFL’s ammonia compressor retrieved from an old ship in Chittagong); (v) venturing 
outside the investing MNE’s official network to hire an integrator or purchase equipments and 
machines from independent low-cost suppliers; and (vi) relying at the start-up stage on a sister 
subsidiary which has a similar technological level and culture as the social business. 
 
Finally, future studies could explore sources of technological capability development, in particular 
the role of the various learning processes in influencing the way in which a social business model 
accumulates, or fails to accumulate, production-based and innovative technological capabilities. 
Future research could also investigate the role of factors, other than learning in shaping the process 
of technological development in social businesses, such as the style of leadership and management 
and the role of factors external to the organization such as local institutional frameworks, including 
several types of local policy, their existence and/or functioning.  
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